Work in Progress

Please do not hesitate to write us if you’re interested in reading draft papers.

• Ananiev, Dmitry: “Imperfect Right to Non-Indifference” (argues that imperfect duties are correlative to imperfect rights and provides an account of the right correlative to the duty of beneficence)
  
• Ananiev, Dmitry: “The Nature of Obligatory Ends” (argues that non-consequentialist moral theories should include obligatory ends and explores the main features of such ends)
• Ananiev, Dmitry: “Moral Rights and Deontic Buck-Passing”
• Ananiev, Dmitry: “Reconsidering the Demandingness Objection: Reasons, Costs, and Confinement”
• Arbeiter, Sophia: “Moore's Paradox Generalized”(provides a unified and generalized account of the irrationality manifest in assertions of Moore-paradoxical sentences)
• Arbeiter, Sophia: “What is irrational about akrasia?” (investigates practical akrasia and epistemic akrasia together, i.e. on the level of reason-sensitive sensitive attitudes)
• Arbeiter, Sophia: “Kripke on logical belief” (discusses and builds on Kripke's (2024) 'The Question of Logic', developing an account of the relationship between logic and thought)
• Arbeiter, Sophia: “Can unalterable attitudes be structurally irrational?” (responds to an objection to disjunctive, wide-scope formulations of rational requirements, arguing that only reason-sensitive attitudes may be structurally (ir)rational; together with Jason Kay)
• Arridge, Alexander: “It Fits! It Fits! It Fits! Why a Reasons-First Analysis of Fittingness Fits the Bill”
  
• Arridge, Alexander: “Morality Demands More of You The Better You Are”
• Arridge, Alexander: “Reasons as Causes of Virtuous Action”
• Arridge, Alexander: “Fallen Creatures: Normativity as a Symptom of Imperfection”
• Behrens, Singa: “The Structure of Normativity” (argues that normativity is not disjunctive and provides a positive argument for the X-First program)
  
• Behrens, Singa: “A relationship-based account for directed normative reasons” (provides an account of directed normative reasons that is based on the notion of a relationship as introduced by Scanlon (1998))
  
• Behrens, Singa: “Unity at the Fundamental Level of Normativity” (argues that explanation-based accounts of normative reasons do worse than Reasons-First accounts in terms of explanatory-power because on their account normative primitives might be radically disunified.)
• Behrens, Singa: “No Guide to Ground: Right-making and Right-makers” (a reasons-based account of right-making and value-making relations)
  
• Behrens, Singa: “The Normatively Fundamental” (provisionally forthcoming in New Directions for Fundamentality, Philosophical Studies (Special Issue))
  
• Behrens, Singa: “Against Explanationism about Normative Reasons” (a defence of reasons fundamentalism against standard and hybrid forms of explanationism, provisionally forthcoming in The Structure of Normativity. Exploring the Prospects of the Reasons-First Approach (eds. Benjamin Kiesewetter, Singa Behrens))
• Behrens, Singa: “The subset view of normative reasons and how the number of reasons counts” (argues that it is crucial for the subset view of normative reasons, i.e., the view that different flavors of reasons, such as moral, prudential or aesthetic reasons, are subsets of the totality of reasons, to get the numbers right and defends a ground-based solution to the problem)
  
• Eisenbach, Leo: “Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness: moral and
  epistemic” (ongoing dissertation project in which I investigate to which extent praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are structurally analogous across different normative domains)
• Eisenbach, Leo: “Clutter Avoidance and the Balancing View of Ought” (argues that an account of the epistemic ought in terms of the balance of epistemic reasons does not entail that we ought to clutter our minds with countless trivialities)
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin: “Epistemic Oughts and the Balance of Reasons”
  
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin: “How to Be a Deontologist and Still Save the Greater Number” (a reasons-based defense of the duty to save the greater number)
  
• Meyer zu Knolle, Marius: “A Scalar Model of Reasons Possession” (ongoing dissertation project)
  (develops an account of reason possession that integrates insights from decision theory into a reasons-first normative framework. It challenges standard binary models of reasons possession by arguing that agents can possess reasons to varying degrees, depending on their evidence for the reason-giving facts and evidence for a reason’s weight.)
  
• Ward, Shane: “When Factives Fail to be Factives” (argues that a recent defense of the non-factivity of 'reasons why' fails to vindicate the analysis of normative reasons to phi in terms of reasons why one ought to phi)
• Ward, Shane: “Reasons, Virtue, and Knowledge”
• Ward, Shane: “The Transitivity of Explanation and Explanationism about Reasons” (explores the transitivity objection to the view that normative reasons should be analyzed in terms of explanatory reasons)
• Watkins, Eliot: “Cutting Reasons Down to Size” (argues that Reasons Fundamentalists will struggle to explain facts about the degree to which we ought to hold certain attitudes)
  
• Watkins, Eliot: “Reasons to do the Non-Specific” (provides an account of reasons to do non-specific/disjunctive actions)
  
• Wegener, Marie: “Reasons and Value” (ongoing dissertation project)