Work in Progress

Please do not hesitate to write us if you’re interested in reading draft papers.

• Ananiev, Dmitry: “Imperfect Right to Non-Indifference” (argues that imperfect duties are correlative to imperfect rights and provides an account of the right correlative to the duty of beneficence)
  
• Ananiev, Dmitry: “The Nature of Obligatory Ends” (argues that non-consequentialist moral theories should include obligatory ends and explores the main features of such ends)
  
• Arridge, Alexander: “It Fits! It Fits! It Fits! Why a Reasons-First Analysis of Fittingness Fits the Bill”
• Arridge, Alexander: “How Should We Understand the Balancing View of Ought?” (Paper under review at Ethics)
  
• Arridge, Alexander: “Morality Demands More of You The Better You Are”
• Arridge, Alexander: “Reasons as Causes of Virtuous Action”
  
• Arridge, Alexander: “Fallen Creatures: Normativity as a Symptom of Imperfection”
  
• Behrens, Singa: “The Structure of Normativity” (argues that normativity is not disjunctive and provides a positive argument for the X-First program)
  
• Behrens, Singa: “A relationship-based account for directed normative reasons” (provides an account of directed normative reasons that is based on the notion of a relationship as introduced by Scanlon (1998))
  
• Behrens, Singa: “Unity at the Fundamental Level of Normativity” (argues that explanation-based accounts of normative reasons do worse than Reasons-First accounts in terms of explanatory-power because on their account normative primitives might be radically disunified.)
• Behrens, Singa: “No Guide to Ground: Right-making and Right-makers” (a reasons-based account of right-making and value-making relations)
• Behrens, Singa: “First Things First: Why A Reason is Always Prior” (a defence of reasons fundamentalism against standard and hybrid forms of explanationism)
• Behrens, Singa: “The Normatively Fundamental” (provisionally forthcoming in New Directions for Fundamentality, Philosophical Studies (Special Issue))
  
• Behrens, Singa: “Against the New Explanationists: Why A Reason is Always Prior” (provisionally forthcoming in Reduction in Metaphysics, Mind and Metaethics (eds. Ralf Bader, Alex Moran))
  
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin: “Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought” (provisionally forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics)
  
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin: “Epistemic Oughts and the Balance of Reasons”
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin: “What We May Expect of Each Other” (a reasons-based account of moral obligation)
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin: “How to Be a Deontologist and Still Save the Greater Number” (a reasons-based defense of the duty to save the greater number)
  
• Meyer zu Knolle, Marius: “More or Less Rational: A Framework for Comparative Rationality” (ongoing dissertation project ) (develops a framework for understanding rationality as reasons-responsiveness that accounts for both minimal thresholds of rationality and comparative judgments about degrees of rationality)
  
• Ward, Shane: “When Factives Fail to be Factives” (argues that a recent defense of the non-factivity of 'reasons why' fails to vindicate the analysis of normative reasons to phi in terms of reasons why one ought to phi)
• Ward, Shane: “Reasons, Virtue, and Knowledge”
• Ward, Shane: “The Transitivity of Explanation and Explanationism about Reasons” (explores the transitivity objection to the view that normative reasons should be analyzed in terms of explanatory reasons)
• Wegener, Marie: “Reasons and Value” (ongoing dissertation project)